Multi-player games provide a general framework for studying social interactions in groups of individuals.
Introduction
Multi-player games provide a general framework for studying social interactions in groups of individuals.
This framework allows researchers to systematically address pervasive questions in the social and biological sciences, such as whether communities produce and maintain cooperation, or else succumb to the tragedy of the commons [1] [2] [3] . As the number of players participating in a game increases, so too does the space of possible strategies the players may adopt and the corresponding space of possible outcomes for the game. This explosion of complexity is especially acute in iterated multi-player games, in which players may choose to update how they play in response to the outcomes of previous interactions. The vast array of possible strategies in iterated multi-player games makes it difficult to assess the prospects for cooperation or defection in general.
Here we take a step towards resolving this difficulty, by constructing a theoretical framework that enables us to identify the memory-1 strategies that resist replacement by any other such strategy, for an arbitrary repeated n-player game, in a replicating population of N ≥ n players. These results generalize our recent work on the evolutionary robustness of strategies in two-player games [4, 7, 10] . Whereas our earlier results were restricted to an evolving population engaged in dyadic interactions [7, 10] , here, by contrast, individuals in the population are engaged in n-way interactions. The composition of strategies for the n-player game evolves in the population over time. We analyze the evolutionary robustness of strategies in such a population, under both strong selection and under weak selection. Under strong selection the notion of evolutionary robustness is equivalent to that of a Nash equilibrium -and so our results include a complete characterization of cooperative memory-1 Nash equilibria for n-player games.
Our results provide a number of surprising insights about the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer public-goods games -insights which typically contravene the view of cooperation that arises when
Evolution in a population of players
We consider an evolving population of N players, in which, at any time, each player is characterized by a memory-1 strategy for the n-player game. In each "generation" all players participate in a series of iterated n-player games, such that all possible combinations of players from the population meet and play together (Fig 1) . A focal player X then receives a total score, T X , which is the average of all of the scores S X she receives across all of the games she plays in that generation. We then model evolution according to the copying process [6] , so that a randomly chosen player, X, updates her strategy by copying the strategy of a player Y with a probability f X→Y that depends on the difference between their total scores:
where σ denotes the strength of selection.
We focus on evolution under weak mutation, so that a strategy X is resident in the population; a single mutant strategy Y arises through mutation; and subsequently Y is either lost or goes to fixation in the population, before another mutant arises.
Evolutionary robust strategies
We assess the evolutionary success of a memory-1 strategy by determining its ability to resist selective invasion by all other memory-1 strategies [1, 7, 10] . A memory-1 strategy X that is resident in the population is said to be "evolutionary robust" if no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade it when rare [7, 10, 15] . In the limit of strong selection (i.e N → ∞) a strategy is evolutionary robust iff it is a Nash equilibrium (i.e. if no player can gain by unilaterally switching strategy). More explicitly, a strategy X is evolutionary robust under strong selection iff
for any mutant strategy Y , where the subscript indicates the number of mutants present in the population.
In the limit of weak selection (i.e. the limit N → ∞ keeping the product N σ ∼ 1 fixed), even an initially disadvantageous mutant may reach high frequency in the population through genetic drift. Thus under weak selection, a strategy is said to be robust if no mutant goes to fixation with probability > 1/N , i.e. with a likelihood exceeding the neutral fixation probability [7, 10, 15] (see SI).
Self-cooperating and self-defecting strategies
We will focus our analysis of evolutionary robustness on two subsets of memory-1 strategies: those that self-cooperate, and those that self-defect. By definition, when all players in a game use a self-cooperating strategy, then all players assuredly cooperate at equilibrium and the payoff to all players is R c,n−1 .
Robust self-cooperating strategies therefore stabilize cooperative behavior in a population. Similarly, by definition, when all players in a game use a self-defecting strategy, then all players assuredly defect at equilibrium, and the payoff to all players is R d,0 . Robust self-defecting strategies therefore stabilize selfish behavior in a population.
We develop a method to identify the evolutionary robust self-cooperating and evolutionary robust self-defecting strategies, in an arbitrary n-player game. We then study in detail the n-player public-goods game [1] [2] [3] , and we investigate the nature of robust strategies: how should a player behave in order to be robust? What proportion of self-cooperating strategies are robust, and what proportion of self-defecting strategies are robust?
Coordinate transform for an n-player game Central to our ability to determine the sets of robust strategies is the identification of a coordinate transform for the space of memory-1 strategies (see SI). The analogous coordinate transform for twoplayer games [1] , which we previously used to identify all robust memory-1 strategies [7, 10] , arose from the discovery of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies [1, 4] . ZD strategies have since been generalized to nplayer games [2, 3] ; and we have derived the analogous coordinate transform for the full space of memory-1 strategies in an n-player game (see SI). Under the new coordinate system, a strategy is characterized by 2n parameters (φ, κ, χ 0 , . . . χ n−2 , λ 1 , . . . λ n−1 ), such that the probability of a focal player cooperating in a given round, given that k of her opponents cooperated in the previous round, is given by
The upper expression provides the probabilities of cooperating assuming the focal player cooperated in the previous round; and the lower expression applies when the focal player defected in the previous round. Under this coordinate system, the equilibrium score of the focal player X, denoted S X , and the equilibrium scores of her opponents, denoted S 1 , . . . , S n−1 are related by the expression
where
Here v c k−1 denotes the rate at which player X cooperates along with k − 1 of her opponents at equilibrium, and v d k denotes the rate at which she defects while k of her opponents cooperate at equilibrium. As noted above, we will focus primarily on self-cooperating strategies, which have κ = R c,n−1 , and self-defecting strategies, which have κ = R d,0 .
Eq. 4 is a complicated expression, but it can nonetheless by employed to determine sets of robust strategies in an arbitrary n-player game (see SI). Eq. 4 reduces to a linear relationship between the players' scores when the λ and γ terms are zero, which corresponds to a ZD strategy [1] [2] [3] . More generally, Eq. 4 can be understood as containing (i) a term for the average score of player X's opponents; (ii) A term, paramaterized by χ 0 , which determines the direction of change of X's score with her opponent's average score; (iii) A constant term, peramaterized by κ, which parameterizes the score all players receive when they all use the same strategy; and (iv) A set of non-linear terms, parameterized by λ and γ, which alter the relationship between players' scores based on the equilibrium rates of cooperation and defection, v c k−1 and v d k .
Extortion and generosity
Extortion strategies are a subset of self-defecting strategies, first introduced in the context of ZD strategies in two-player games. In general, an extortionate player can be defined as one who plays such that any small deviation from mutual defection results in the extortionate player outperforming her opponents' average score. More precisely, the extortion strategies are those satisfying κ = R d,0 and χ 0 > 0. In twoplayer games extortion strategies are typically not robust, and ZD extortion strategies are never robust, in evolving populations [7, 10] .
Generous strategies are a subset of self-cooperating strategies, and they represent the anti-pode to extortion strategies. More precisely, the generous strategies are those satisfying κ = R c,n−1 and χ 0 > 0.A generous player is one who plays such that any small deviation from mutual cooperation results in the generous player receiving less than the average score of her opponents. In two-player games, most generous strategies are evolutionary robust, and all ZD generous strategies are robust under strong selection [1, 7, 10] .
Public-goods games
Although the co-ordinate transform above, and its resulting relationship between players' scores, applies to all n-player games, we now apply it to study the n-player public-goods games. These games provide the standard framework for studying cooperation in multi-player interactions. Under the public-goods game, players who cooperate pay a cost c, while players who defect pay no cost. For each player who cooperates, a benefit b is yielded, which is then shared equally among all players in the game. The resulting payoffs are
In the two-player public-goods setting, for which γ = 0 in Eq. 4, self-cooperating strategies are robust under strong selection iff λ > −χc and λ > −χ(b − c) [1, 7, 10] . Since b > c, this implies that generous strategies are typically robust under strong selection (Fig. 2) . Conversely, self-defecting two-player strategies are robust under strong selection iff λ > χ(b − c) and λ > χc, which implies that extortionate strategies are typically not robust under strong selection (Fig. 2) . In the next section we explore how the introduction of a third player alters these results on the robustness of extortion and generosity.
Moving from two players to three players
In a three-player game, the set of robust self-cooperating strategies under strong selection is given by
Here we see that extortionate ZD strategies can be robust if χ 0 < 1/2, in contrast to the two-player case where extortionate ZD strategies are never robust. More generally, self-defecting strategies with χ 0 < 1/2 are frequently robust, for a wide range of values of λ and γ parameters (Fig. 3 ).
To summarize, we find that, while both self-cooperating and self-defecting strategies can be robust in either two-or three-player public-goods games, increasing the number of players broadens the set of extortion strategies that are robust, and conversely diminishes the set of generous strategies that are robust.
Robust three-player strategies under weak selection
In the limit of strong selection, N → ∞, the population size has not effect on the set of strategies that are evolutionary robust. By contrast, in the regime of weak mutation N σ 1, robustness conditioned depend explicitly on the population size, N . In this section we determine the cooperative and defecting threeplayer strategies that are robust under weak selection. In this regime, just as in the two-player setting, we find that self-cooperating strategies can be robust whereas self-defecting strategies cannot be robust.
More precisely, the space of robust self-cooperating strategies under weak selection is given by (see SI):
where we have written
According to this result, generous ZD strategies can be robust only when χ 0 > N +1 6N −2 and, more generally, larger values of χ 0 are required for self-cooperating strategies to be robust than in the two-player case. Thus, even in the limit of weak selection, increasing the number of players from n = 2 to n = 3 diminishes the possibilities for robust cooperation in a population.
Moving from three players to many players Following our observations about two-and three-player games, we now consider the prospects for cooperation and defection when even more players are involved. For arbitrary n, the set robust self-cooperating strategies under strong selection is given by (see SI):
Here w c k and w d k denote the equilibrium rates of playing cooperate or defect from the perspective of the invading mutant, and the γ parameters are defined in terms of the λ's (see SI). While this is a complicated expression, we can once again make a number of straight-forward observations about the prospects for robust cooperation.
Firstly, a generous ZD strategy can be robust only if χ 0 > n−1 n−2 . Thus in the limit as n becomes large, a generous ZD strategy can never be robust under strong selection. Furthermore, as n becomes large, the set of robust self-cooperating strategies is diminished in general, requiring the term A, which depends on a player's strategy, to exceed a threshold that increases as n increases.
In contrast, the set of self-defecting strategies that are robust under strong selection is given by
Here we see that extortionate ZD strategies are robust if χ 0 < n−1 n−2 , and so they are always robust in the limit n → ∞. Furthermore, the condition for robust self-defection becomes increasingly easy to satisfy as the number of players n becomes large.
Although robust self-cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of players increases, this does not imply it becomes impossible to achieve. Indeed, we can always construct a robust self-cooperating strategy by setting each term of the sum A to be greater than the corresponding term in the robustness condition, i.e. 
for each k. The only constraint on such a construction is that this choice produce a viable strategy, i.e.
that it produce a probability p i k in Eq. 3 in the range [0, 1] . A strategy is viable in the public-goods game provided (see SI)
Setting λ k + γ d k to its maximal value, we can determine whether each term of the inequality above is satisfied, and thus a robust strategy is guaranteed. The results for both robust self-cooperating and robust self-defecting strategies are shown in Fig. 4 . We find that, provided χ 0 is greater than (for selfcooperating) or less than (for self-defecting) a finite threshold, a robust strategy is always guaranteed.
Furthermore we find that in the limit of n → ∞, this threshold value is χ 0 > 1/2 for self-cooperating strategies. That is, evolutionary robust self-cooperating strategies exist across a wide range of parameters, regardless of how many players interact in the game.
Discussion
We have constructed a general framework for identifying evolutionary robust memory-1 strategies in arbitrary, iterated n-player games. The conditions for robustness are quite complex, and the full enumeration of robust strategies of a given type must in general be carried out numerically.
However, our results nonetheless reveal a number of surprising, general trends for public-goods games.
We have shown that increasing the number of players in such a game tends to increase the ability of extortion strategies to thrive in populations, and to limit the capacity for generosity. However, the consequences of this trend are less dire than one might suppose. While an analysis restricted to ZD strategies alone would lead to the conclusion that large games permit only extortion, an analysis of the full space of memory-1 strategies reveals something quite different: robust generosity becomes constrained, but robust self-cooperation is always possible in the public-goods game, regardless of the number of players.
Furthermore, the size of the set of of robust, self-cooperating strategies does not tend to zero, even as the number of players grows without bound.
Provided players are not too generous (i.e. provided χ 0 > 1/2), the evolution of robust cooperation is always possible in the n-player public-goods game. However, in contrast to the two-player setting, the evolution of robust extortion becomes increasingly likely.
Literature Cited We model evolution in a population of N players who face all other players in iterated, n-player games (top). Each individual has a "genotype" consisting of a strategy, defined by 2n probabilities for cooperation in each round. Evolution is modelled under weak mutation, such that all players initially adopt the same strategy, and mutations are then introduced that change a player's strategy. Mutant strategies are drawn uniformly from the 2n-dimensional space of memory-1 strategies. Natural selection and genetic drift occur according to a "copying" process [6] , as described in Eq. 1. Only "evolutionary robust" strategies can resist selective invasion. Figure 2 : The relationships between self-cooperate, self-defect, extortion, generosity, and evolutionary robustness in two-and three-player games, under strong selection. In a two-player game, generous strategies are typically robust, and extortionate strategies are typically non-robust. In a three-player game, by contrast, the proportion of generous strategies (and self-cooperating strategies) that are robust is diminished. Furthermore, the proportion of extortionate strategies (and self-defections strategies) that are robust is also diminished. Also shown are the locations of the classic, two-player strategies [7, 15] win-stay-lose-shift, tit-for-tat, always cooperate, always defect and generous tit-for-tat. Their analogues for the three-player game are also shown. The potential for extortion and for generosity changes as the number of players in a game increases. As n increases, the maximum value of χ 0 below which robust extortion is guaranteed tends to 1 (its maximum value).
However the minimum value of χ 0 above which robust generosity is guaranteed tends to 1/2 (see SI). Thus, in the limit of large n, both robust extortion and robust generosity are guaranteed. The upper and lower bounds shown in the figure represent necessary conditions for the existence of robust extortion and robust generosity. And so that the purple region (in which both robust extortion and robust generosity exist) may be larger than indicated, but it cannot be smaller than indicated. Thus, the figure indicates that there is a large potential for the evolution of both robust extortion and robust generosity, as the number of players increases.
Supporting infromation Overview of Supporting Information
In this supplement we study iterated n-player games in which players have two choices in each round. We identify the memory-1 strategies that are able to resist selective invasion by any other memory-1 strategy in an evolving population of players. Such strategies are called "evolutionary robust", as defined formally
below. An iterated n-player game consists of an infinite series of "rounds" in which each player chooses to either "cooperate" (c) or "defect" (d). A memory-1 strategy stipulated that the probability of cooperation in the current round depends on the outcome of only the preceding round. The full space of memory-1 strategies in such an n-player game has dimension 2 n . To identify strategies that are evolutionary robust across such a large space we first introduce a convenient coordinate transform for the space of memory-1 strategies, which generalizes our understanding of zero-determinant strategies [1, 4, 10] . This coordinate transformation enables us to find sets of memory-1 strategies that are robust to invasion by any other memory-1 strategy in an evolving population. We apply this method to analyse evolutionary robustness in various n-player iterated public goods game.
Throughout our analysis we will assume that players cannot distinguish between their opponents, so that each memory-1 player cooperates in the current round based only on how many opponents cooperated in the previous round. We first identify the subset of self-cooperating or self-defecting memory-1 strategies that are evolutionary robust under strong selection, which is equivalent to identifying the Nash equilibria within these strategy sets. We then analyse in detail the case of a multi-player public goods game in the limit of a large number of players, and we identify the sets of strategies that lead to robust cooperation or robust defection. Finally, we analyse the case of a three-player public-goods game, for which we enumerate all robust cooperating strategies under both strong and weak selection -and in particular we show how the robustness of cooperation and defection depend explicitly on the costs and benefits of cooperation.
Iterated n-player games
We consider an iterated game with an infinite number of successive rounds between a player, X 0 and her opponents X 1 , X 2 . . .X n−1 . We study games for which, in each round, each player has two choices, denoted cooperate (c) and defect (d). The payoffs for the focal player X 0 is given by R c,k−1 , if she cooperates along with k − 1 of her opponents, and it is given by R d,k if she defected while k of her opponents cooperated.
We will focus on public goods-type games, for which
given k players cooperating in total, those who defected receive a higher payoff than those who cooperated
so that, typically, the more of her opponents cooperate, the higher the payoff the focal player receives.
We will focus in particular on the most typical type of public goods game, for which R c,k
Equilibrium payoffs in Iterated Games
The longterm scores received by n memory-1 players in an iterated game are calculated from the equilibrium rates of the different plays. In an n-player game there are 2 n possible plays in each round, and a memory-1 player's strategy is thus defined by the probability of cooperating in the current round given the outcome of the previous round. We adopt the notationp = (−1 + p c cc.
for a player's strategy, where the superscript indicates the focal player's play and the subscript indicates the plays of her n − 1 opponents in the last round. We adopt the convention that the strategy vector is ordered with the p c terms first followed by the p d terms, and within each subset the strategies are ordered according to how many opponents cooperated, from most to least.
For a given number k of cooperators there are (n − 1)!/k!(n − k − 1)! terms. These are ordered so that the first term has the ordering p ccc. . .ddd , i.e all the c's then all the d s (the ordering of the rest of the terms will not matter). When players do not distinguish between opponents these (n − 1)!/k!(n − k − 1)! orderings are degenerate, and we write a strategy in terms of p i k -namely, the probability of cooperating given the focal player's play in the previous round and given that k of her opponents cooperated in the previous round. 
where I = (1, 1, 1, 1), p i is the strategy of players X i , and R 0 is the payoff vector of player X 0
As shown in [2, 3] , the determinant D(p 0 , p 1 . . .p n−1 , f ) arises from a generalization of the results of Press & Dyson, [4] for two-player games, and gives the dot product between the stationary vector v and an arbitrary vector f = (f cc , f cd , f dc , f dd ) [4] , where
In the example of a three player game between players X, Y and Z, the determinant is given by 
Eq. 1 can be used to calculate the scores received by n memory-1 players in a given game. However, there are certain cases in which the Markov chain describing the iterated game has multiple absorbing states, and the denominator of Eq.1 goes to zero. The scores in these cases can be calculated by assuming that players execute their strategy with some small "error rate" [5] , so that the probability of cooperation is at most 1 − and at least . Assuming this, and taking the limit → 0 then gives the player's scores in the cases where multiple absorbing states exist.
Eq. 1 is a generalization of Press & Dyson's treatment of two-player games, and, just as in two-player games, these results have led to the discovery of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies for multi-player games [2, 3] . ZD strategies enforce a linear relationship between a player's score and her opponents'
scores. Such multi-player ZD strategies are discussed in detail in [2, 3] . Here we simply note that a ZD strategy in a multi-player game is given by a strategy vector of the form
where R j is the payoff vector of the jth player, and the α j 's are free constants except that they must be chosen so that the resulting vector encodes probabilities (i.e. numbers between zero and one). Here we retain the convention that the zeroth player is the focal player.
Evolution in a population of players
We study the evolution of memory-1 strategies in a population of N individuals playing an iterated nplayer game, with N ≥ n. In each generation, all subsets of n players in the population engage in the iterated game, and each player in the population receives a total score across all the N −1 n−1 games in which she participates. We assume that the population is well-mixed, so that the makeup of different strategies these games depends upon the frequencies of strategies in the population. We focus on evolution under weak-mutation, in which a strategy X is resident in the population; a single mutant strategy Y arises through mutation; and Y is subsequently either lost or goes to fixation in the population, before another mutant arises. We always use X to denote the resident, and Y the mutant, strategy. Under this weak-mutation assumption there are at most two strategy types present in the population at any time.
We use the notation S X j to denote the payoff to strategy X in a single iterated game involving j players of type Y and n − j players of type X. We use the notation S Y j to denote the payoff to strategy Y in a single iterated game involving j players of type Y and n − j players of type X. When the population as a whole contains i players of type Y and N − i players of type X, then, the total score to a player of type X, denoted T X (i), is given by
where the sum over j denotes the different number of opponents of type Y that X may face in the n-player games she plays in a single generation. The total score to a mutant Y in such a population, denoted T Y (i), can be calculated in the same way.
We model evolution according to the copying process [6] , in which pairs of players are drawn at random from the population, and the first player switches her strategy to that of the second player with a probability that depends on the difference between their total scores. Thus a player using a strategy X switches to Y with probability
where σ is a parameter denoting the strength of selection.
The "strong-selection" limit of this process is defined by taking N → ∞ while keeping σ fixed, so that even small differences in payoffs convey a significant advantage to the player with the greater payoff.
Alternatively, the "weak-selection" limit arises by taking N → ∞ while keeping the product N σ ∼ 1 fixed, in which case even deleterious strategies may reach high frequency through genetic drift. We consider both of these regimes of selection in our analyses below.
Evolutionary robustness
The concept of evolutionary robustness [7] is similar to the notion of evolutionary stability [8, 9] , but more useful for studying which strategies will dominate in evolving populations under public-goods games [7, 10] .
In general, a strategy is defined to be evolutionary robust if, when resident in a population, there is no mutant that is favored to spread by natural selection when rare [7] .
More precisely, under strong selection a resident strategy X is evolutionary robust iff S Y 1 ≤ S X 0 for all strategies Y . This condition for evolutionary robustness under strong selection is identical to that of a Nash equilibrium [1] .
Under weak selection, by contrast, a resident strategy X is evolutionary robust iff the fixation proba-bility of any new mutant Y satisfies ρ X→Y ≤ 1/N (see [7] ), where
This expression for the fixation probability of a new mutant can be Taylor-expanded in terms of σ to give an equivalent, simpler expression for evolutionary robustness under weak selection. For a three-player game, such an expansion leads to the following condition for the evolutionary robustness of resident strategy X in a population of size N :
Coordinate Transform
In two-player games, the ZD framework of Press & Dyson has been generalized to provide a coordinate transform for the full space of memory-1 strategies [RES]. This coordinate transformation permits a simple closed-form expression relating the scores of two players in a game, which has enabled us to identify all evolutionary robust memory-1 strategies, under both strong and weak selection. Here we extend this line of analysis to multi-player games. We begin by identifying an analogous coordinate transform for the 2 n -dimensional space of memory-1 strategies in an n-player game.
To define the desired co-ordinate transform we must identify 2 n vectors that form a basis in R n and that allow us to write down a simple, closed-form relationship between the players' scores in a given game.
These vectors consist firstly of the n + 1 vectors that form a ZD strategy (see Eq.3), which are composed of the n vectors R for each player's payoff along with the identify vector I, with entry 1 in all positions.
The second set of vectors in the coordinate transform consists of the n − 1 vectors denoted L k , where L k is has entry 1 when k players cooperated in the previous round and entry 0 otherwise, regardless of the focal player's play in the previous round.
The final 2 n − 2n vectors required for the coordinate transform account for the degeneracy that arises because players do not distinguish between opponents. To see this, observe that there are (n − 1)!/m!(n − m − 1)! possible ways in which m opponents can cooperate in a given round. If players do not distinguish between opponents, the probability of the focal player cooperating given that m of her opponents cooperated in the previous round, cannot depend on who cooperated. Furthermore, in order to ensure that we can choose the α j in Eq.3 freely when players do not distinguish their opponents, we i , where the zeroth play is that which is ordered cccc. . .dddd. In summary, the 2 n vectors for the coordinate transform consist of
• n vectors R for the player's payoffs, and the vector I which together form the components of a ZD strategy.
• n − 1 vectors L k with entry 1 when k players cooperated in the previous round.
• 2 n − 2n vectors G with a single entry 1, to account for the degeneracy which arises when different combinations of opponents cooperate.
For clarity's sake, we can write down this coordinate system explicitly for the case of n = 3 players, X, Y , and Z. The new coordinate system is
which is therefore a basis R 8 .
In general, a strategy in this coordinate new system is given by a vector of the form:
From Eq.1 the scores of the players are then related by the expression
where S j denotes the equilibrium score of player j in the current game, and v c k denotes the rate at which the focal player cooperates along with k of her opponents, at equilibrium, i.e.
and v c k,i denotes the rate at which the focal player cooperates along with k of her opponents in the ordering given by i.
We now define the parameters χ 0 = −α 0 / n−1 l=1 α l ; χ j = α j / n−1 l=1 α l for j = 1, . . . , n − 1; and κ = α n /(χ 0 − 1). In this new parameterization we can re-write the relationship among the players' scores as: Our analysis here is restricted to the case in which a memory-1 player does not distinguish between her opponents, and so uses a strategy that depends only on her own play and on how many of her opponents cooperated in the previous round. Under this assumption, a memory-1 strategy consists of 2n probabilities for cooperation, with 2 n − 2n degenerate probabilities which constrain the γ m,j . Starting from Eq. 8 are now able to make two observations: 
where we have set 
If we recall our convention that the equation lacking a γ is that which is ordered with ccc.....dddd etc we then have
In this coordinate system, when players do not distinguish between their opponents, a strategy is defined by a vector of 2n numbers, (φ, κ, χ 0 , . . . , χ n−2 , λ 1 , . . . , λ n−1 ). In practice, we often denote such a strategy vector in terms of γ's, with the understanding that Eq. 10 describes how to convert these γ's into terms involving χ's.
We can now write the relationship between the players' scores as
In the case when one player uses strategy Y and the rest use strategy X we then have the following relationship between scores:
From Eq. 6, we can now write any memory-1 strategy in the form
where, again, k denotes the number of players who cooperated in the previous round.
Since a viable strategy must have 0 ≤ p k ≤ 1 we must additionally require
Some useful inequalities
We now derive some inequalities that, in combination with Eq. 11, will allow us to identify the strategies that are evolutionary robust in n-player games. In general, we can write the score of a focal player with resident strategy X as
where and
Solving for w gives
which allows us to write the score of X as
We can now write the difference between the scores of X and Y scores as
which enables us to identify upper and lower bounds on the difference between two players' scores, namely
which becomes an equality when Y always defects at equilibrium and
which becomes an equality when Y never defects at equilibrium. We can similarly write, for the sum of the player's scores,
This gives an upper bound on the sum
which becomes an equality when w d 0 = 0 at equilibrium (i.e it is never the case that all players defect). Finally we have a lower bound on the sum
which becomes an equality when w c n−1 = 0, (i.e it is never the case that all players cooperate at equilibrium). which becomes an equality when Y never defects at equilibrium.
It is also convenient to rewrite Eq. 11 for the relationship between two player's scores in terms of w to give
We can now use Eq 12-16 to identify the strategies that are evolutionary robust, in either strong or weak selection, in multi-player games.
Equilibrium rates of play
The above inequalities depend, and the robustness conditions we derive from the below, in general depend on the equilibrium rates of play, w i k . However as discussed above, these inequalities are hardest to satisfy when an opponent plays always defect (Eq.12), always cooperate (Eq 13), w d 0 = 0 (Eq 14) or w c n−1 = 0 (Eq. 15). In a given game, the equilibrium rates of play in these extremal cases can be determined numerically to find the sets of strategies that are robust, as illustrated in Fig. S1 . However, unlike in the two-player game [7, 10] , the resulting conditions often depend on the parameter φ. Thus in Fig. S1 , there are certain choices of parameters (λ, γ, κ, χ) for which the robustness of a strategy depends on φ.
Generosity and extortion
We focus on the evolutionary robustness of two subsets of memory-1 strategies: self-cooperating strategies and self-defecting strategies. Self-cooperating strategies are such that, when all players in a game adopt a self-cooperating strategy, all players cooperate in every round at equilibrium. Such strategies have p c n−1 = 1. Self-defecting strategies are such that, when all players in a game adopt a self-defecting strategy, all players defect in every round at equilibrium. Such strategies have p d 0 = 0. If a strategy X is self-cooperating, we have κ = R c,n−1 ; and all players receive payoff R c,n−1 when they all use strategy X. If a strategy X is a self-defecting, we have κ = R d,0 ; all players receive payoff R d,0 when they all use strategy X.
Furthermore, we look within the sets of self-cooperating and self-defecting strategies at the potential for generosity and extortion. Generous strategies are a subset of self-cooperating strategies. A generous player, when faced with a defecting opponent, will tend to cede a higher score to her opponent than she herself receives. And generous players are defined to have κ = R c,n−1 and χ 0 > 0. Extortion strategies are a subset of self-defecting strategies. A extortionate player, when faced with a cooperating opponent, will tend to demand a higher score for herself than her opponent receives. And so extortionate players are defined to have κ = R d,0 and χ 0 > 0.
In the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma (n = 2), generous strategies (and in particular, zero-determinant generous strategies) have been shown to be evolutionary robust whereas extortion strategies (and in particular, zero-determinant extortion strategies) have been show to be evolutionary unstable, under either strong or weak selection. We study whether this trend persists as games grow in the number of interacting players n.
Robust self-cooperating strategies under strong selection
We first identify the self-cooperating strategies that are robust under strong selection. As defined above, a self-cooperating strategy X is such that, if all players use the strategy, all players cooperate every turn at equilibrium. Such strategies must have κ = R c,n−1 .
A mutant strategy Y can selectively invade a self-cooperating strategy under strong selection iff
Using Eq. 16 this can be re-written as
for χ 0 < n−2 n−1 and
otherwise. Combining Eq. 12 and Eq. 16 we find
as a necessary condition for invasion, and therefore the condition
provides our first condition for evolutionary robustness. This condition is most stringent when the mutant always defect.
Similarly, combining Eq 14 and Eq 16 gives
as our second robustness condition. This condition is most stringent when w d 0 → 0. Eq. 19 and Eq. 20 together provide necessary and sufficient conditions for robustness under strong selection.
In summary, the set of robust cooperating strategies in an n-player game under strong selection, which we denote C n s , is given by:
in which
Each of the conditions (Eq.19-20) on the value of A is hardest are satisfy when the opponent plays always defect, or w d 0 = 0, respectively. For any given game, explicit expressions for the equilibrium rate of play, w, can be found in each of these cases, and the resulting set of robust strategies can be fully enumerated (e.g. Fig. S1 ) We analyze these conditions for some specific public-goods games below.
Robust self-defecting strategies under strong selection
We now identify the self-defecting strategies that are robust under strong selection. As defined above, a self-defecting strategy X is one such that, if all players adopt the strategy, all players defect every turn at equilibrium. Such strategies must have κ = R d,0 .
A mutant strategy Y can selectively invade a self-defecting strategy under strong selection iff
Using Eq. 16 this can be re-written as (S In summary, the set of robust defecting strategies in an n-player game under strong selection, which we denote D n s , is given by
and each of the three conditions (Eq. 23-24) is hardest to satisfy when the opponent plays w c n−1 = 0, or always cooperate respectively. Explicit expressions for the equilibrium rate of play, w, can be found in each of these cases, and the resulting set of robust strategies can be fully enumerated for a given game (Fig. S1 ) We analyze these conditions for some specific public-goods games below.
Robust cooperation when n 1
We now analyze the conditions for robust cooperation when a game involves many players, i.e when n → ∞. In this limit we have n−2 n−1 → 1, and, since χ 0 ≤ 1, we can rewrite Eq 19 with nz = k. Neglecting terms order 1/n and larger, the most stringent robustness condition for self-cooperation becomes
Now consider the public goods game, for which
Note that this condition is never satisfied for ZD strategies, which have λ = γ = 0. Thus, ZD strategies are never robust as the number of players n becomes large.
Furthermore, from Eq 10 we have
However, recall that n−1 j=1 χ j = 1. Thus in the limit of large n we can approximate
, which is O (1/n); and in the limit of large n we have
Now writing
we retrieve the robustness condition
Furthermore the maximum value of λ * k is
and thus we require
This condition is hardest to satisfy when the mutant always defects, and it is therefore guaranteed to be satisfied if
This condition in turn is hardest to satisfy for z = 1, and so robust cooperating strategies are guaranteed to exist if χ 0 > 1/2.
In summary, the set of robust cooperating strategies in an n-player pubic-goods game under strong selection, as n → ∞, which we denote C ∞ s , is given by
The set of robust self-cooperating strategies in the limit n 1 exclude zero-determinant strategies, but nonetheless they include a large number of generous strategies, with χ 0 > 0 and, typically λ * k > 0. In particular, by choosing χ 0 > 1/2 a player is guaranteed to be able to choose values of λ * k that produces a robust strategy. Thus, evolutionary robust cooperation is maintained even in games with arbitrarily many players.
Robust defection when n 1
We study the conditions for robust defection when a game involves many players, i.e when n → ∞.
Analogous to the case of cooperation, we we rewrite the robustness condition Eq. 24 with nz = k and neglecting terms order 1/n and larger. In this case the most stringent robustness condition for self-defection becomes
so that we have
This condition is satisfied for ZD strategies, which have λ * k = 0, and is satisfied in general for any positive choice of λ * k . In summary, the set of robust defecting strategies in an n-player game under strong selection, as n → ∞, which we denote D ∞ s , is given by
The set of robust self-defecting strategies in the limit n 1 includes zero-determinant strategies, and in particular extortion strategies. This is in striking contrast to the two-player case (n = 2), in which extortionate ZD strategies are never robust. Furthermore, a self-defecting player is not constrained in her choice of χ 0 : for any choice of χ 0 she can can always choose λ * k such that her strategy is robust. Since smaller values of χ 0 correspond to greater extortion, this implies that large games permit highly extortionate players to thrive in evolving populations, whereas small games do not.
Robust cooperative strategies for the three-player public goods game
We now turn our focus to the three-player public goods game, and we study the potential for generosity and for extortion in detail, under both strong and weak selection. Our first robustness condition is given 
From Eq. 12, this condition is hardest to satisfy when the mutant always defects, so that we have and each of the conditions is hardest to satisfy when the opponent plays w c n−1 = 0 or always cooperate respectively. Explicit expressions for the equilibrium rate of play, w, can be found in each of these cases, and the resulting set of robust strategies can be fully enumerated for any choice of payoffs (Fig. S1) .
Note that the three-player game permits extortionate ZD strategies to be robust in an evolving population if χ 0 < 1/2. This is in contrast to the two-player game in which extortion strategies are never robust.
Robust strategies under weak selection
We now turn to the regime of weak selection, for the three player public goods game, and once again study the prospects for robust cooperation or extortion. as the condition for Y to selectively replace X. From Eq. 16 we can then write which typically permits robust ZD strategies. This is most stringent when w d 0 = 0. The values of w can be calculated numerically for a given choice of φ.
In summary, the set of robust cooperating strategies in a three-player game under weak selection, which we denote C 3 w , is given by Figure S1 : Confirmation by Monte-Carlo simulation of analytical conditions for evolutionary robustness of threeplayer strategies. For both generous self-cooperators and extortionate self-defectors we compare analytic expression for evolutionary robustness (black lines) with numerical calculations of robustness. Coordinates (λ 1 , λ 2 ) for selfcooperators and self-defectors were sampled in regular intervals of 0.01 within the space of all feasible strategies For each sampled pair of co-ordinates (λ 1 , λ 2 ) we also sampled 10 2 associated values of φ, ranging from φ → 0 to the maximum feasible φ. To determine numerically whether a focal strategy X = (λ 1 , λ 2 , χ 0 , χ 1 , κ, φ) is robust we computed the longterm payoffs S 
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